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Abstract
Merkle trees are ubiquitous in blockchains and other distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). They
guarantee that the involved systems are referring to the same binary tree, even if each of them knows
only the cryptographic hash of the root. Inclusion proofs allow knowledgeable systems to share
subtrees with other systems and the latter can verify the subtrees’ authenticity. Often, blockchains
and DLTs use data structures more complicated than binary trees; authenticated data structures
generalize Merkle trees to such structures.
We show how to formally define and reason about authenticated data structures, their inclusion
proofs, and operations thereon as datatypes in Isabelle/HOL. The construction lives in the symbolic
model, i.e., we assume that no hash collisions occur. Our approach is modular and allows us to
construct complicated trees from reusable building blocks, which we call Merkle functors. Merkle
functors include sums, products, and function spaces and are closed under composition and least
fixpoints. As a practical application, we model the hierarchical transactions of Canton, a practical
interoperability protocol for distributed ledgers, as authenticated data structures. This is a first
step towards formalizing the Canton protocol and verifying its integrity and security guarantees.
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1 Introduction
Authenticated data structures (ADSs) allow systems to use succinct digests to ensure that
they are referring to the same data structure, even if each system knows only a part of the
data structure. The benefits are twofold. First, this saves storage and bandwidth: the systems
can store only the structure’s parts that are relevant for them, and transmit just digests, not
the whole structure. Blockchains use ADSs for this reason, both in the core design and in
various optimizations (e.g., Bitcoin’s lightweight clients). Second, ADSs can keep parts of
the structure confidential to the subset of the systems involved in processing the structure.
For example, distributed ledger technology (DLT) promises to keep multiple organizations
synchronized on their shared business data. Synchronization requires transactions, i.e.,
atomic changes to the shared state. Yet organizations often do not want to share their full
state with all involved parties. Some DLT protocols such as the Canton interoperability
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tx: Bob and Alice complete the purchase contract
visible to: Alice, Bob
subtx: Alice instructs Bank to
move money to Bob’s account
visible to: Alice, Bob, Bank
subtx: Bob instructs DMV to
transfer the car title to Alice
visible to: Alice, Bob, DMV
Figure 1 A hierarchical Canton transaction. DMV is the de-





Figure 2 Example topol-
ogy of a Canton-based dis-
tributed ledger.
protocol [7] and Corda [8] leverage ADSs to provide both transactions and varying levels of
confidentiality. Formal reasoning about blockchains and DLTs thus often requires mechanised
theories of ADSs. In fact, the formalization of Canton was the starting point for this work.
Merkle trees [20] are the prime example of an ADS. They are binary trees of digests, i.e.,
cryptographic hashes. Leaves contain data hashes, and inner nodes combine their children’s
hashes using a hash function h. An inclusion proof, also known as a Merkle proof, shows that
a tree t includes a subtree st. It consists of the roots of t and st and the siblings of nodes on
the path between these roots. The proof is valid if the hash of every node on the path is h
of the children’s hashes. It is sound, i.e., does prove inclusion, if h is collision-resistant. It
keeps the rest of the tree confidential if h is preimage-resistant and the hashed data contains
sufficient entropy.
ADSs [21] generalize these ideas to arbitrary finite tree data structures, whose hierarchies
can conveniently encode more complex relationships between data. Our main example are
the hierarchical transactions [4] in the Canton protocol. Suppose that Alice wants to sell a
car title to Bob. Figure 1 shows the corresponding Canton transaction for exchanging the
money and the title. (We take significant liberties in the presentation of Canton in this paper
and focus on parts relevant for the construction of ADSs and for reasoning about them.)
The transaction is generated from a smart contract (written in the DAML [10] programming
language) implementing the purchase agreement.
The transactions’ hierarchical nature benefits Canton in three crucial ways. First, complex
transactions can be composed from simpler building blocks, which are transactions themselves.
The purchase transaction above composes two such sub-transactions: the money transfer
and the title transfer. Second, participants learn only the contents of subtransactions they
are involved in. Above, the Bank only sees the money transfer, but not what Alice bought;
similarly, the DMV does not learn the car’s price. This also improves scalability, as everyone
processes only the subtransactions they are involved in. Third, the hierarchy enables correct
delegation in Canton’s built-in authorization logic even in a Byzantine setting. Canton
encodes this hierarchy, enriched with some additional data, in ADSs, and exchanges inclusion
proofs for subtransactions. We give more details throughout the paper, but summarize the
resulting requirements on the formalization here:
1. It must support ADS digests, to check that two inclusion proofs refer to the same ADS.
This allows the example transaction to commit atomically, even if the Bank and the DMV
see only a part of it.
2. Proofs must enable proving inclusion for multiple subtrees simultaneously, not just single
subtree as standard. Canton uses such inclusion multi-proofs to save bandwidth.
3. Inclusion proofs refering to the same ADS must be mergeable into one multi-proof. In the
example of Figure 1, Alice receives inclusion proofs for the entire transaction as well as
both sub-transactions, and merges them to a single data structure, the entire transaction.
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In this work, we show how to modularly define ADSs as datatypes in Isabelle/HOL. The
modular approach is our main theoretical contribution. It allows us to construct complicated
trees from small reusable building blocks, for which properties are easy to prove. To that end,
we consider authenticated data structures as so-called Merkle functors and equip them with
appropriate operations and their specifications. The class of Merkle functors includes sums,
products, and function spaces, and is closed under composition and least fixpoints. Hence,
the construction works for any inductive datatype (sums of products and exponentials).
Concrete functors are defined as algebraic datatypes using Isabelle/HOL’s datatype package
[3]. This shallow embedding is a significant practical benefit, as it enables the use of Isabelle’s
rich reasoning infrastructure for datatypes. The construction lives in the symbolic model,
i.e., we assume that no hash collisions occur. Finally, we show that the theory is suitable
for constructing concrete real-world instances such as Canton’s transaction trees. Our
formalization is available in the Isabelle AFP [18].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the background
on Canton and use it to motivate our abstract interface for ADSs. Section 3 shows how to
construct such interfaces for tree-like structures in a modular fashion. Section 4 demonstrates
how to create inclusion proofs for general rose trees and Canton transactions in particular.
We discuss the related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Operations on Authenticated Data Structures
We now present the interfaces for ADSs, motivated by their application to Canton. Figure 2
shows a suitable Canton-based deployment for our example transaction. The participants
transact using Canton, a distributed commit protocol similar to a two-phase commit protocol.
The protocol is run over a Canton domain operated by a third party that acts as the commit
coordinator. While the participants may be Byzantine, the domain is assumed to be honest-
but-curious. That is, it is trusted to correctly execute the protocol, but it should not learn
the contents of a transaction (e.g., how much Alice pays to Bob). Unlike in most other DLT
solutions, participants share business data only on a need-to-know basis [6]. In particular,
the domain receives business data only in encrypted form or as a digest. The domain may
only learn the metadata that allows the protocol to tolerate Byzantine participants.
These privacy requirements motivate the hierarchical transactions that Canton uses,
which are encoded in transaction trees. The tree for the example transaction from Figure 1
is shown in Figure 3. Each (sub)-transaction of Figure 1 is turned into a view in Figure 3,
which consists of the view data and view metadata. For example, the node labeled by 1 in
Figure 3 is the view corresponding to the top-level transaction in Figure 1. Its first two
children contain the view’s data and metadata. The metadata lists who is affected by the
view and should therefore participate in the commit protocol (here, Alice and Bob), and is
shared with Alice, Bob and the domain. The view data contains the confidential data with
the actual state updates, and is shared only with Alice and Bob. This view also has two
subviews, which correspond to the sub-transactions in Figure 1 as expected. Views can have
an arbitrary number of subviews; e.g., the views labeled by 1.1 and 1.2 have no subviews.
Additionally, the two leaf children of the tree root store metadata describing transaction-
wide parameters that apply to all views. The first is visible to the domain and the participants
involved in the transaction; the second only to the latter. Formally, the transaction tree can be
modelled by the following datatypes, for some types common-metadata, participant-metadata,
view-metadata, and view-data whose contents are irrelevant for this paper.
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Figure 3 Simplified Canton transaction tree for car title sale of Figure 1.
datatype view = View 〈view-metadata〉 〈view-data〉 (subviews: 〈view list〉)
datatype transaction =
Transaction 〈common-metadata〉 〈participant-metadata〉 (views: 〈view list〉)
In Figure 3, the Transaction and View constructors become the inner nodes (black circles)
and the data sits at the leaves (grey rectangles).
The participants and the domain can use a root hash of an ADS over a Transaction to
ensure that they are all referring to the same transaction tree. When constructing ADS
hashes, we need to consider ADSs with multiple roots (i.e., forests) rather than just a single
root like in a Merkle tree. For example, computing the hash of an inner node in a Merkle
tree requires taking a hash over both of its children, i.e., over the forest constructed from
its two children. The concrete hash operation depends on the shape of the forest (a pair in
this case). The new root is again a degenerate forest of a single tree with a single root hash.
This view underlies our modular construction principle in Section 3.
In this paper, we use the following Isabelle notations: Type variables ′a, ′b are prefixed
by ′ like in Standard ML. Type constructors like list are usually written postfix as in string
list. Exceptions are the function space ⇒, sums +, and products ×, all written infix. The
notation t :: τ denotes that the term t has the type τ . In our construction, we will use the
following decorations. Raw data to be arranged in an ADS is written as usual, e.g., ′a, ′a list.
Hashes and forests of hashes carry a subscript h as in ′ah. We leave hashes for now abstract
as type variables and define them only in Section 3. Since the root hash identifies an ADS,
we represent ADSs by their hashes.
A root hash makes communication more efficient, but we require more. For example,
the Bank does not know the contents or participants of view 1.2; the domain hides the
latter. Still, the Bank must ensure that the view 1.1 is really included in the transaction
tree. In general, the views visible to a participant are called the participant’s projection of
the transaction. Canton aims to achieve the following integrity guarantee [4]: There exists a
shared ledger that adheres to the underlying DAML smart contracts such that its projection
to each honest participant consists exactly of the updates that have passed the participant’s
local checks. This requires the ability to prove that a substructure is included in a root hash.
Inclusion proofs are therefore the main workhorse in our formalization and the focus of
this paper. We denote the type of inclusion proofs over the source type with the subscript m,
e.g., ′am, ( ′am, ′ah) treem. We need two operations on inclusion proofs:
1. Computing the (forest of) root hashes of an inclusion proof, in order to identify the ADS
to which the inclusion proof corresponds.
2. Merging two inclusion proofs with the same root hash.
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Accordingly, we introduce two type synonyms for these operations:
type_synonym ( ′am, ′ah) hash = 〈 ′am ⇒ ′ah〉
type_synonym ′am merge = 〈 ′am ⇒ ′am ⇒ ′am option〉
We model the merge operation as a partial function using the option that returns None
iff the inclusion proofs have different (forests of) root hashes. We require that merging is
idempotent, commutative, and associative. The merge operation makes inclusion proofs
with the same hash into a semi-lattice, where the induced order treats an inclusion proof as
smaller than another if it reveals less. In that case, we say that the smaller is a blinding of
the larger inclusion proof.
type_synonym ′am blinding-of = 〈 ′am ⇒ ′am ⇒ bool〉
I Definition 1. A Merkle interface consists of three operations h :: ( ′am, ′ah) hash and m ::
′am merge and bo :: ′am blinding-of with the following properties:
1. Merge respects hashes, i.e., (h a = h b) = (∃ ab. m a b = Some ab).
2. Merge is idempotent, i.e., m a a = Some a.
3. Merge is commutative, i.e., m a b = m b a.
4. Merge is associative, i.e., m a b >>= m c = m b c >>= m a,
where (>>=) is the monadic bind on the option type.
5. Blinding is induced by merge, i.e., bo a b = (m a b = Some b).
So merge is the least upper bound in the blinding relation:
(m a b = Some ab) = (bo a ab ∧ bo b ab ∧ (∀ u. bo a u −→ bo b u −→ bo ab u))
Also, the equivalence closure of the blinding relation gives the equivalence classes of the
inclusion proofs under the hash function: equivclp bo = vimage2p h h (=) where equivclp R
denotes the equivalence closure of R and vimage2p f g R = (λx y. R (f x) (g y)) the preimage
of a relation under a pair of functions.
Isabelle/HOL’s term language is not expressive enough to automatically create the ADS
and inclusion proof types of arbitrary tree-shaped data, define the interface’s operation, or
build inclusion proofs for subtrees of tree-shaped data. Instead, in the next two sections, we
show how to systematically construct these types and operations.
3 Modularly Constructing Forests of Authenticated Data Structures
In this section, we develop the theory to modularly construct ADSs, their inclusion proofs as
HOL datatypes, and Merkle interfaces over them. We start with the concept of a blindable
position (Section 3.1), which models an ADS node, and show how we obtain ADSs for
Canton’s transaction trees by introducing blindable positions in the right spots of the
datatype definitions (Section 3.2).
We have shown how the Merkle interface specification is preserved by type composition
(Section 3.3). It is, however, not inductive and therefore not preserved by datatype construc-
tions. We thus generalize it and show that functor composition and least fixpoint preserve
the generalization (Section 3.4). Finally, we show that sums, products and function spaces
preserve the generalization (Section 3.5) and compose these preservation results to obtain
the Merkle interface properties for Canton transactions (Section 3.6).
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3.1 Blindable position
A blindable position represents a node (inner node or leaf) in an ADS. Recall that “blinding”
allows an inclusion proof to hide the node contents by using just the root hash of the node.
In this work, we model such hashes symbolically, that is, as injective functions, and assume
that no hash collisions occur. We do not assume surjectivity though: some hashes do not
correspond to any value. We model such values as garbage coming from a countable set (the
naturals). This suffices as digests contain only a finite amount of information.
datatype ′ah blindableh = Content 〈 ′ah〉 | Garbage 〈nat〉
Since the hash function is injective, we can identify the values ′a with a subset of the
hashes, namely those of form Content. Accordingly, we could also have written ′a blindableh
instead of ′ah blindableh. However, as an ADS contains hashes of hashes, ′ah is more accurate
here. For example, a degenerate Merkle tree with a single leaf, which stores some data x, has
the root hash Content x.
What does an inclusion proof for this tree look like? It can take two forms. Either it
reveals x, i.e., the leaf is not blinded, or it does not reveal x, i.e., the leaf is blinded. The
following datatype formalizes these cases.
datatype ( ′am, ′ah) blindablem = Unblinded 〈 ′am〉 | Blinded 〈 ′ah blindableh〉
Similar to blindableh, inclusion proofs may be nested, e.g., if a Merkle tree leaf contains
another Merkle tree as data. We therefore use the inclusion proof type variable ′am instead
of ′a. In the second case, the hash could be garbage, so we use ′ah.
Note that our blindableh hashes are typed: hashes of those ADSs that store ints and those
that store strings in their leaves always differ. In the real world, they can be equal as hashes
are just bitstrings. However, for systems which follow security best practices, type flaw
attacks lead to different hashes unless a hash collision occurs. Garbage hashes adequately
model such confusion possibilities: a hash of the int Leaf would be treated as garbage in the
type of hashes for the ADS of strings. This is adequate for inclusion proofs because we care
about the contents of a hash only if the position is unblinded and thus of shape Content.
Having introduced the types for blindable positions, we now define the corresponding
operations and show that they satisfy the specification merkle-interface. The hash operation
hash-blindable :: ( ′am, ′ah) hash ⇒ (( ′am, ′ah) blindablem, ′ah blindableh) hash converts
an inclusion proof into the root hash of the tree. It is parameterized by a hash function
ha that converts nested inclusion proofs ′am into their root hashes ′ah. Its definition is
straightforward: for unblinded nodes, apply ha, and for blinded nodes, just take the contained
hash. Similarly, the blinding order blinding-of-blindable :: ( ′am, ′ah) hash ⇒ ′am blinding-of
⇒ ( ′am, ′ah) blindablem blinding-of is parametrized by the hash ha and the blinding order
boa for the nested inclusion proofs, as well as the blindable inclusion proofs to be compared.
If both of the compared inclusion proofs unblind the contents, then we compare the contents
using boa. Otherwise, the first argument is a blinding of the second one only if it is blinded,
and if its hash matches the hash of the second argument. Merging of blindable positions
is also similar. If both positions are unblinded, merge-blindable tries to merge the contents.
If both are blinded, it succeeds iff the hashes are the same. Otherwise, it checks that the
hashes are the same and, if so, returns the unblinded version. It is straightforward to show
the following lemma.
I Lemma 2. If ha, boa, and ma jointly form a Merkle interface, then so do hash-blindable
ha, blinding-of-blindable ha boa, and merge-blindable ha ma.
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3.2 Example: Canton transaction trees
We now illustrate how to use blindableh and blindablem to define the ADSs and inclusion
proofs for the Canton transaction trees from Section 2. As shown in Figure 3, the trans-
action tree contains a node for the transaction tree as a whole, every view, and every leaf
(common-metadata, participant-metadata view-metadata, and view-data). Yet, the datatype
declarations do not contain the information what should become a separate node in the ADS.
To make the construction systematic, we start from an isomorphic representation of view
and transaction, where we mark the blindable positions with the type constructor blindable,
which is just the identity functor:
datatype view = View
〈((view-metadata blindable × view-data blindable) × view list) blindable〉
datatype transaction = Transaction
〈((common-metadata blindable × participant-metadata blindable) × view list) blindable〉
To define the hashes and inclusion proofs, we simply replace each type constructor τ with
its counterparts τh and τm. For views, this looks as follows. Here ×h, ×m, listh, and listm
are type synonyms for × and list; Section 3.5 introduces them formally. We abuse notation
by writing view-metadatah and view-metadatam for the blindable position of view-metadata.
type_synonym view-metadatah = 〈view-metadata blindableh〉
type_synonym view-datah = 〈view-data blindableh〉
datatype viewh = Viewh 〈((view-metadatah ×h view-datah) ×h viewh listh) blindableh〉
type_synonym view-metadatam = 〈(view-metadata, view-metadata) blindablem〉
type_synonym view-datam = 〈(view-data, view-data) blindablem〉
datatype viewm = Viewm
〈((view-metadatam ×m view-datam) ×m viewm listm,
(view-metadatah ×h view-datah) ×h viewh listh) blindablem〉
These types nest hashes and inclusion proofs: A view node, e.g., nests hashes and inclusion
proofs for the metadata, the data, and all the subviews. In particular, the viewh and viewm
datatypes recurse through the blindableh and blindablem type constructors. This works
because blindableh and blindablem are bounded natural functors (BNFs) [3]. In fact, this
transformation works for any datatype declaration thanks to the compositionality of BNFs.
The construction for transaction trees is similar.
3.3 Composition
Having defined the types of ADSs, we next must define the operations on ADSs and prove
that they form a Merkle interface. Doing so directly is possible, but prohibitively complex.
Instead, we modularize the proofs following the structure of the types. We can derive
preservation lemmas for all involved type constructors analogous to merkle-blindable.
The preservation lemmas are compositional by construction: if ′ah τh/( ′am, ′ah) τm
and ′bh σh/( ′bm, ′bh) σm satisfy merkle-interface, then so does their composition ′ah τh
σh/(( ′am, ′ah) τm, ′ah τh) σm. For example, we can define the instance for blindable nodes
of type view-data compositionally. First, we exploit the fact that every nullary functor
satisfies merkle-interface with the discrete ordering (=), hash id and merge defined only for
equal operands. Second, we compose view-data, viewed as a nullary functor with blindable.
For example, we define:
abbreviation hash-view-data :: 〈(view-datam, view-datah) hash〉 where
〈hash-view-data ≡ hash-blindable id〉
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We perform the same constructions on view-metadata, and then use composition for the
pair view-metadata × view-data, to get the following (the operations for products will be
introduced in Section 3.5).




3.4 Inductive generalization for least fixpoints
The view datatype is the least fixpoint of the functor
′a F = ((view-metadata blindable × view-data blindable) × ′a list) blindable
and so are viewh and viewm of analogous functors Fh and Fm. Composition gives us a
preservation theorem for F, but we need another one for least fixpoints.
Yet, the Merkle interface specification is not inductive and thus not preserved by fixpoints.
We now generalize it. Simultaneously, we make the generalization more amenable to Isabelle’s
proof automation by focusing on the blinding order and characterizing merge as its join. Our
generalization splits the Merkle interface into three:
1. The interface blinding-respects-hashes assumes that bo ≤ vimage2p h h (=) where (≤)
denotes inclusion on binary predicates.
2. The interface blinding-of-on formalizes the order properties of the blinding relation bo:
Reflexivity bo x x, transitivity bo x y =⇒ bo y z =⇒ bo x z, and antisymmetry bo x y
=⇒ bo y x =⇒ x = y hold for all x ∈ A and all y, z: The restriction of x to the set A
makes the statement inductive, as A can be instantiated to the set of smaller values in
structural induction proofs.
3. The interface merge-on extends blinding-of-on applied to the type’s universal set UNIV
with the characterization of merge as the join, but now again restricted by a set A. In
the unrestricted case A = UNIV, merge-on is equivalent to the Merkle interface.
We are now ready to define the class of Merkle functors. For readability, we only spell
out the case of unary functors. The generalization to n-ary functors is as expected.
I Definition 4 (Merkle functor). A unary BNF Fh and binary BNF Fm constitute a unary
Merkle functor if there exist operations:
hash ′F :: (( ′ah, ′ah) Fm, ′ah Fh) hash and
blinding-of F :: ( ′am, ′ah) hash ⇒ ′am blinding-of ⇒ ( ′am, ′ah) Fm blinding-of and
mergeF :: ( ′am, ′ah) hash ⇒ ′am merge ⇒ ( ′am, ′ah) Fm merge
with the following properties
Monotonicity
bo ≤ bo ′
blinding-of F h bo ≤ blinding-of F h bo ′
Congruence
∀ a∈A. ∀ b. m a b = m ′ a b
∀ x ∈ {y. set1-Fm y ⊆ A}. ∀ b. mergeF h m x y = mergeF h m ′ x y
A. Lochbihler and O. Marić 6:9
Hashes
blinding-respects-hashes h bo
blinding-respects-hashes (hashF h) (blinding-of F h bo)
Blinding order
blinding-of-on A h bo
blinding-of-on {x. set1-Fm x ⊆ A} (hashF h) (blinding-of F h bo)
Merge
merge-on A h bo m
merge-on {x. set1-Fm x ⊆ A} (hashF h) (blinding-of F h bo) (mergeF h m)
where hashF h = hash ′F ◦ map-Fm h id for the BNF mapper map-Fm, and where the BNF
setter set1-Fm x returns all atoms of type ′am in x :: ( ′am, ′ah) Fm.
Every Merkle functor preserves the Merkle interface specification: set A = UNIV in the
merge property and use the equivalence between the Merkle interface and merge-on. With
this, we now state the main theoretical contribution of this paper.
I Theorem 5. Merkle functors of arbitrary arity are closed under composition and least
fixpoints.
Proof. (Sketch) Closure under composition is obvious from the shape of the properties and
the fact that BNFs are closed under composition. For closure under least fixpoints, we
consider a functor F and its least fixpoint T through one of F ’s arguments. say datatype
T = T 〈T F 〉, and similarly for Th and Tm. The operations are defined as follows, where we
omit all Merkle operation parameters for type parameters that are not affected.
The hash operation hash-T ′ is defined by primitive recursion:
hash-T ′ (Tm x) = Th (hash-F ′ (map-Fm hash-T ′ x)).
The blinding order blinding-of-T is defined inductively by the following rule:
blinding-of-F hash-T blinding-of-T x y
blinding-of-T (Tm x) (Tm y)
Monotonicity ensures that blinding-of-T is well-defined.
Merge merge-T is defined by well-founded recursion over the subterm relation on Tm:
merge-T (Tm x) (Tm y) = map-option Tm (merge-F hash-T merge-T x y)
Congruence ensures that merge-F calls merge-T recursively only on smaller arguments.
Monotonicity and preservation of blinding-respects-hashes are proven by rule induction on
blinding-of-T. Congruence, blinding-of-on, and merge-on are shown by structural induction
on the argument that is constrained by A. J
Isabelle/HOL lacks the abstraction over type constructors necessary to formalize this
theorem. As our approach also translates to theorem provers with more expressive type
systems (e.g., Lean, Coq), the theorem could be formalized there. For Isabelle/HOL, we
adopt an approach similar to Blanchette et al. [3]. We axiomatize a binary Merkle functor
and carry out the construction and proofs for least fixpoints and composition, illustrating how
the definition and proofs generalize to functors with several type arguments. The example
ADS constructions in Section 3.6 then merely adapt these proofs to the concrete functors at
hand.
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3.5 Concrete Merkle functors
We now present concrete Merkle functors. They show that the class of Merkle functors is
sufficiently large to be of interest. In particular, it contains all inductive datatypes (least
fixpoints of sums of products). We have formalized all of the following.
The discrete functor from Section 3.3 with hash operation id and the discrete blinding
order (=) is a nullary Merkle functor.
Blindable positions blindableh and blindablem are a unary Merkle functor.
Sums and products are binary Merkle functors. We set ×h = ×m = × and +h = +m
= +. The hash operations hash-prod and hash-sum are the mappers map-prod and
map-sum, respectively. The blinding orders blinding-of-prod and blinding-of-sum are the
relators rel-prod and rel-sum. The merge operation merge-of-prod attempts to merge
each component separately, while merge-of-sum can only merge left and left, or right and
right values. (Formally, ×m and +m should take four type arguments. However, as sums
and products do not themselves contain blindable positions, the type arguments ′ah and
′bh are ignored in inclusion proofs and we therefore omit them.)
The function space ′a ⇒ ′b is a unary Merkle functor in the codomain. Like for sums
and products, ⇒h = ⇒m = ⇒ and no additional type arguments are added. Hashing is
function composition and the blinding order is pointwise.
3.6 Case study: Merkle rose trees and Canton’s transactions
Theorem 5 shows that all datatypes built from the Merkle functors in the previous section are
Merkle functors. We apply the construction sketched in the proof to concrete datatypes that
build on top of each other. For example, lists, rose trees [24], and Canton transactions are
all Merkle functors. We prove that ′a list is a Merkle functor with the help of an isomorphic
data type that is the least fixpoint µX . 1 + ′a × X and following the fixpoint construction
of Theorem 5. We transfer the definitions and theorems to list using the transfer package
[16]. Rose trees are then given by the datatype
datatype ′a rose-tree = Tree 〈( ′a × ′a rose-tree list) blindable〉
Applying the construction gives us Merkle rose trees with the corresponding operations and
their properties.
datatype ′ah rose-treeh = Treeh 〈( ′ah ×h ′ah rose-treeh listh) blindableh〉
datatype ( ′am, ′ah) rose-treem = Treem
〈( ′am ×m ( ′am, ′ah) rose-treem listm, ′ah ×h ′ah rose-treeh listh) blindablem〉
From here, it is only a small step to transactions in Canton. Views are isomorphic to Merkle
rose trees where the data at the nodes is instantiated, i.e., composed, with the Merkle functor
corresponding to view-metadata blindable × view-data blindable. Then, transactions compose
the Merkle functor for common-metadata blindable × participant-metadata blindable × - list
with views. We have lifted our machinery from these raw Merkle functors to the datatypes
viewm and transactionm using the lifting and transfer packages [16].
4 Creating Inclusion Proofs
So far, given a tree-like data type ′t, we showed how to systematically construct the corre-
sponding type of ADSs ′th and their inclusion proofs ′tm. To make use of this construction
in practice, we must also be able to create values of type ′tm from values of type ′t. As
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in the case of our composition and fixpoint theorem, HOL’s lack of abstraction over type
constructors makes it impossible to express this process in HOL in its full generality. Instead,
we sketch how it works on rose trees, as these are the most general type of tree in terms of
branching. The construction can be easily adapted for other kinds of trees.
There are three basic operations:
Digesting, hash-source-tree, returns the root hash for a rose tree.
Embedding, embed-source-tree returns the inclusion proof that proves inclusion of the
whole tree.
Fully blinding, blind-source-tree returns the inclusion proof that proves no inclusion at all
(the root is blinded).
Digesting and fully blinding conceptually do the same thing, but their return types ( ′ah
rose-treeh and ( ′am, ′ah) rose-treem) differ. As rose trees are parameterized by their node
label type, digesting, embedding, and fully blinding take parameters which digest, embed, or
fully blind the node labels. The expected properties hold: the embedded and fully blinded
versions of the same rose tree have the same hash, namely the digest of the rose tree, and
the former is a blinding of the latter.
The more interesting operations concern creating an inclusion proof for a subtree of a
tree. For example, with Canton’s hierarchical transactions, we would like to prove that a
subtransaction is really part of the entire transaction. Such a proof consists of the subtree
itself, together with a path connecting the tree’s root to the subtree’s root. As noticed
by Seefried [23], this corresponds to a zipper [15] focused on the subtree. This connection
enables simple manipulation of such proofs in a functional programming style, well-suited to
HOL. The zippers for rose trees are captured by the following types.
type_synonym ′a path-elem = 〈 ′a × ′a rose-tree list × ′a rose-tree list〉
type_synonym ′a path = 〈 ′a path-elem list〉
type_synonym ′a zipper = 〈 ′a path × ′a rose-tree〉
Given a zipper that focuses on a node, we define the operations that turn rose trees into
zippers and vice versa.
tree-of-zipper ([], t) = t
tree-of-zipper ((a, l, r) · z, t) = tree-of-zipper (z, Tree (a, l @ t · r))
zipper-of-tree t ≡ ([], t)
The zippers for Merkle rose trees, i.e., inclusion proofs for rose trees, have the exact same
shape, except that all the type constructors are subscripted by m and have another type
parameter capturing the type of hashes (e.g., ( ′am, ′ah) zipperm). Like for rose trees, we
define operations that blind and embed a path respectively. This way, zippers on rose trees
can be turned into zippers on Merkle rose trees. As expected, starting with a rose tree zipper,
blinding and embedding its path yields a Merkle rose tree with the same hash. Furthermore,
reconstructing a Merkle rose tree from an embedded rose tree zipper gives the same result as
first reconstructing the rose tree and then embedding it into a Merkle rose tree. Finally, we
show that reconstruction of trees from zippers respects the blinding relation if the Merkle
operations on the labels satisfy merkle-interface:
blinding-of-tree h bo (tree-of-zipperm (p, t)) (tree-of-zipperm (p, t ′)) =
blinding-of-tree h bo t t ′
Inclusion proofs derived from zippers prove inclusion of a single subtree of the rose tree.
The general case of several subtrees can be reduced to the single-subtree case using merging.
When we want to create an inclusion proof for several subtrees, we create an inclusion proof
for each individual subtree and then merge them into one.
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To that end, we have defined operations to turn a rose tree into a zipper focused on
the root and into zippers into its subtrees. Then, the function zippers-rose-tree enumerates
the inclusion proof zippers for all nodes of a rose tree using those two operations. This
allows us to easily model the messages that the initiator of a transaction sends in the first
phase of Canton’s commit protocol. The initiator constructs all zippers for the views in
the transaction tree, and then turns each such zipper into an inclusion proof. Finally, the
initiator merges each view proof with the proof from the zipper for the transaction metadata
and ships it to the recipients.
At the end of the two-phase commit protocol, the domain’s commit message contains an
inclusion proof of the view metadata for all the views that the participant should have received.
The participant can decide whether it has received all views it was supposed to receive, it
compares this inclusion proof against the merged inclusion proofs that it had received from
the initiator, using the inclusion proof order blinding-of-transaction on transactions.
5 Related Work
Miller et al. developed a lambda calculus with authentication primitives for generic tree
structures [21]. The calculus was formalized in Isabelle/HOL by Brun and Traytel [5]. In the
calculus, the programmer annotates the structures with authentication tags. Given a value
of such a structure, and a function operating on it, their presented method automatically
creates a correctness proof accompanying a result. The proof allows a verifier that holds
only a digest of values with authentication tags (but not the values themselves) to check
the function’s result for correctness. The proof is a stream of inclusion proofs, one for each
tagged value that the function operates on. Merging of inclusion proofs is not considered,
although the streams can be optimized by sharing. Unlike Brun and Traytel [5] who use
a deep embedding with the Nominal library, our embedding is shallow. Furthermore, our
ADSs can provide inclusion proofs for multiple sub-structures simultaneously. However, we
do not aim to derive generic correctness proofs for functions on the data structures.
Several other works formalize (binary) Merkle trees. White [25] formalized sparse Merkle
trees [9] as part of a Coq model of a cryptographic ledger. An asset belongs to an address if
the address encodes a path in the sparse Merkle tree from the root node to a leaf with the
asset. A merge operation allows a single Merkle tree to provide several inclusion proofs. Our
generic development can be instantiated to cover this structure. Yu et al. [26] use Merkle
constructions on different binary trees to implement logs with inclusion and exclusion proofs.
The constructions are proved correct using a pen-and-paper approach. The proved properties
are then used in the Tamarin verification tool to analyze a security protocol. Ogawa et al
[22] formalize binary Merkle trees as used in a timestamping protocol. They automatically
verify parts of the protocol using the Mona theorem prover.
As part of the Everest project, HACL∗ contains a formal verification of balanced binary
Merkle trees [13]. The balanced trees represent a sequence of hashes, which is padded with
dummy values to a power of 2. A reduction proof shows that hash collisions between root
hashes can be traced back to hash collisions of the underlying hash function. The main
focus is on a refinement to an efficient executable implementation. It would be interesting to
investigate whether and how their reduction-proof approach to dealing with hash collisions
can be generalized compositionally to our general ADS setting.
Seefried [23] observed that inclusion proofs in a Merkle tree correspond to Huet-style
zippers [15], where the subtrees in zipper context have been replaced by the Merkle root
hashes. McBride showed that zippers represent one-hole contexts [19]. In this analogy, our
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inclusion multi-proofs correspond to contexts with arbitrarily many holes. These many-hole
zippers must not be confused with Kiselyov’s zippers [17] and Hinze and Jeuring’s webs [14],
which are derived from the traversal operation rather than the data structure.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a modular construction principle for authenticated data structures over
tree-shaped HOL datatypes (i.e., functors), and basic operations over these structures. The
class of supported functors includes sums, products, and functions, and is closed under
composition and least fixpoints. The supported operations are root hash computations and
merging of inclusion proofs. We showed how to instantiate the construction to rose trees, as
well as to real-world structures used in Canton, a Byzantine fault tolerant commit protocol.
The ongoing formalization of the Canton protocol will continue to test our abstractions
and trigger further improvements. As noted earlier, ADSs not only improve storage efficiency,
but also provide confidentiality. For example, Canton uses them to keep parts of a transaction
confidential to a subset of the transaction’s participants. However, reasoning about confi-
dentiality is not straightforward. As hashing is injective, we can simply write inv h in HOL
to invert hash functions. In fact, our current model does not even distinguish between the
authenticated data structure and its digest because of this. A sound confidentiality analysis
must therefore restrict the adversary using an appropriate calculus, e.g., a Dolev-Yao style
deduction relation [11]. The analysis must take into account situations such as a Merkle tree
node with two children with identical hashes; unblinding one child automatically unblinds the
other. However, our representation distinguishes between the two, which might represent a
problem. Another situation where this might be a problem is when merging inclusion proofs
for commutative structures. One option is to consider Merkle functors as quotients with
respect to a normalization function that collects all unblinding information and propagates
the unblinding across the whole inclusion proof. The normalized inclusion proofs then serve
as the canonical representatives. We have not yet worked out whether such a construction
can still be modular and whether the quotients are still BNFs [12].
Moreover, our representation of hashes as terms makes hashing injective. While this
is “morally equivalent” to standard cryptographic assumptions, an alternative (followed
by [5]) would be to prove results about authentication as a disjunction: either the result
holds, or a hash collision was found. The advantage of such a statement would be that hash
collisions become explicit, which simplifies the soundness argument for the formalization. As
is, nothing prevents us from conceptually “evaluating” the hash function on arbitrarily many
inputs, which would not be cryptographically sound. To make hash collisions explicit, we
must make hashes explicit, i.e., use a type like bitstrings instead of terms. We do not expect
problems with extending our constructions to such a model, but it is unclear how severely
the indirection through bitstrings impacts our proofs, in particular the Canton formalization.
We have based our construction on bounded natural functors (BNFs) as they are the
semantic domain for datatypes in Isabelle/HOL and closed under least fixpoints. Fortunately,
our Merkle constructions and proof need very little of the BNF structure and therefore
generalize straightforwardly to other systems. For example, Lean’s quotients of polynomial
functors (QFPs) [1] are more general than BNFs and also closed under fixpoints. The concept
of a Merkle functor can be directly expressed on QPFs as the BNF setter in Def. 4 can be
replaced by the predicate lifting for QPFs. The closure proofs for composition and least
fixpoint also work with predicate lifting. Moreover, the meta-theory can be formalized in
Lean’s more expressive type system, even for functors of arbitrary arity, and then instantiated
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for the concrete functor at hand. So in Lean, we would not have to redo the proof for every
ADS. This also applies to other systems like Agda and Coq. Furthermore, the construction of
concrete functors can be mimicked in any system that supports mutually recursive algebraic
datatypes and higher-order functions, as all our ADS are built from sums, products, function
spaces, and nested recursion through other datatypes, e.g., blindableh and blindablem. (Nested
datatype recursion can be reduced to mutual recursion [2], so mutually recursive algebraic
datatypes suffice.)
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